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Abstract
By combining the market model with the three-factor model, this study investigates 
fir ms’ share returns after the announcement of share repurchase. Employing data for 
Chi na’s A-share market, this study’s sample utilizes 417 share repurchase announce-
ments over the pe riod of 2000 to 2012. Empirical results show that firms with higher 
sales gro wth rates are more likely to send a positive signal to the market through their 
share repur chase efforts. Analysis also shows that the higher a firm’s price-to-earnings 
ratio (utilized as a measure of overvaluation), the lower the firm’s cumulative abnormal 
returns. These results imply that Chinese share markets put more emphasis on the 
firm’s future growth and share overvaluation.
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INTRODUCTION
Previous studies have discovered that share repurchases typically lead 
to an increase in share prices (Vermaelen, 1981; Choi, 1997; Stephens 
& Weisbach, 1998; Born et al., 2004) and improvement in firms’ operating 
performance (Nohel & Tarhan, 1998; Lamba & Luan, 2004). Firms repur-
chase shares for a variety of reasons; to take advantage of potential under-
valuation, distribute excess capital, alter a leverage ratio, fend off takeovers, 
to change their capital structure and to counter dilution of share op-
tions (Dittmar, 2000; Billett & Xue, 2007). Further, repurchasing shares 
through debt financing could increase the firm’s leverage and optimize its 
capital structure. This could result in the maximization of the firm’s in-
trinsic value. In addition, a securities buyback could convey information 
that might change investors’ expectations of the firm’s performance and 
lead to an increase in share price (Dittmar, 2000).
The institutional environment in China provides a unique context for ex-
amining share repurchase motivations. Although the private sector has 
been growing rapidly (Allen et al., 2005), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
continue to play a dominant role in the Chinese share markets. For ex-
ample, Chen et al. (2011) reported that 75% of their sample firms were 
SOEs and documented that 33% of listed SOEs have a chief executive offi-
cer (CEO) or chairman who was a current or former government official. 
Given this, one important motivation of Chinese firms’ share repurchas-
es is likely to be the segregation of state-held shares from privately-
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held ones. When firms buy back shares from SOE shareholders, government ownership decreases. As 
the government ownership shrinks through share repurchase, the inefficiency of the firm’s performance 
that results from the government’s blockholding and potential intervention may decrease. As a result, 
investors may view share repurchase as a positive signal, with the firm’s abnormal share returns more 
likely to increase. 
This study aims to investigate effect of reduced government ownership through share repurchase on the 
firm’s share returns. The study uses a model that combines the market model (Fama et al., 1969) with the 
three-factor model (Fama & French, 1992). Our study sample covers 417 share repurchase announce-
ments for the period of 2000 to 2012. The empirical results did not find evidence that share repurchases 
from SOE shareholders yield higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). One likely explanation for 
this finding is that the size of share repurchases aiming at reducing SOE ownership (55 repurchase an-
nouncements) may not be large enough. On the other hand, our results reveal that firms with higher 
sales growth rate are more likely to send a positive signal to the market through share repurchase. In 
addition, the results show that the higher a firm’s price-to-earnings ratio (measure of overvaluation), 
the lower the firm’s CARs. The results imply that the Chinese share markets put more emphasis on the 
firm’s future growth and share overvaluation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides the theoretical background of the 
study. Section 2 describes the data and methods. The econometric estimation results are presented in 
section 3. Final section  concludes the paper with a presentation of limitations and suggestions for future.
1. RELATED LITERATURE 
AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
There is a range of motives for a firm’s repurchase 
of its shares. Born et al. (2004) and Gong (2013) ar-
gue that repurchasing typically leads to an increase 
in share prices, thus increasing the overall value of 
the firm. In general, firms repurchase their shares 
to take advantage of potential undervaluation 
(Jagannathan & Stephens, 2003), distribute excess 
capital (Skinner, 2008; Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 
2013), alter their leverage ratio (Chen, 2013; Gong, 
2013; Dobbs & Rehm, 2005), fend off takeovers 
(Billett & Xue, 2007; Bagnoli & Lipman, 1989) and 
counter the dilution of firm value by the exercise 
of share options (Dittmar, 2000). Previous studies 
have investigated the effects of share repurchase 
announcements on the firm’s price return. These 
have suggested several hypotheses to explain the 
repurchase phenomenon: the signaling hypoth-
esis, leverage ratio hypothesis, earning per share 
hypothesis and other hypotheses focused on gov-
ernment ownership of firms.
The signaling hypothesis proposes that firms repur-
chase shares to publicly convey the management 
expectation of improvement in the firm’s earnings 
(Mitchell et al., 2001). Managers are thought to 
have more complete information about the com-
pany. They are more likely to have access to have 
proprietary data that would increase the accuracy 
of future cash flow and earnings predictions, as 
well as estimates of the fair valuation of shares 
traded in the share market (Grullon & Ikenberry, 
2000). Thes share price usually fails to reflect this 
because investors only have  access to the pub-
lic information. Hence, Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000) argue that in pursuing share repurchases, 
managers are not trying to send new information 
to the market but rather to express their disagree-
ment with how the market is evaluating their cur-
rent performance. By way of announcing share re-
purchases, managers are attempting to send a sig-
nal to the market that the firm’s share prices are 
undervalued.
Firms also repurchase shares to express their 
disagreement with the way the market is in-
terpreting the available public information 
(Jagannathan  &  Stephens, 2003). This view sug-
gests that in a market where information asym-
metry exists, managers are better informed than 
shareholders – managers can use share repurchase 
to signal better future prospects or undervalu-
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ation shareholders (Grullon  &  Ikenberry, 2000; 
Grullon  &  Michaely, 2004). Dann et al. (1991) 
suggested that undervaluation is suspected when 
there appears to be poor price performance pri-
or to share repurchases as well. Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) documented negative abnormal 
returns prior to repurchase announcements. This 
suggests that firms repurchase shares when man-
agers think they are undervalued. Consistent with 
the undervaluation view, Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
found negative returns following prior announce-
ments, which indicates that these firms were un-
dervalued at the time of the announcement of re-
purchase programs.
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) argued that managers 
initiate share repurchase programs not because 
they think the future prospects are improving, but 
because they disagree with the market’s assess-
ment that the firm’s performance is falling. The 
authors challenge that share repurchase is driv-
en by the management belief that the market has 
overreacted to some past publicly accessible infor-
mation. This implies that abnormal returns prior 
to the share repurchase should be the best predic-
tor of long-term abnormal returns. Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996) suggested that a repurchase pro-
gram is an option that gives a firm the ability to 
swap its market value for its true intrinsic value 
if the future market prices are lower than the true 
intrinsic value. Thus, a firm grants itself an option 
through announcing a share repurchase program, 
and the positive value of this option can be reflect-
ed in the abnormal returns accruing from the an-
nouncement (Oded, 2005). 
In support of the signaling hypothesis, Padgett 
and Wang (2007) documented information leak-
ages before the announcements of share repur-
chases in Thailand, while providing evidence 
of positive abnormal returns on announcement 
days. Using Canadian data, Li and McNally 
(2007) found that firms are more likely to buy 
back shares if insiders have large holdings, great-
er free cash flows, lower market-to-book ratios 
and have suffered poor prior share market per-
formance. They also found that the volume of 
private information is positively associated with 
the announcements returns. Using a sample of 
185 Chinese mainland share repurchases, Gong 
(2013) found that the higher a firm’s growth rate 
and the smaller the size of the company’s hold-
ing is likely to bring higher abnormal returns. 
Flannery et al. (2013) observed that information 
asymmetry between bank managers and outside 
investors sharply increased during the 2008 glob-
al financial crisis. They suggested that a share’s 
bid-ask spread must compensate for the market 
maker’s information asymmetry.
The information signaling hypothesis indicates 
that the market is more likely to respond positively 
to small firms’ share repurchase announcements. 
This is probably because small firms are more like-
ly to send a positive signal to the market and their 
share repurchase announcements tended to con-
tain more information than those released by large 
firms (Vermaelen, 1981). In addition, firms with 
higher sales growth rates and greater profitability 
are more likely to send a positive signal to the mar-
ket through share repurchase efforts. In his study of 
a sample of Chinese public firms’ share repurchases, 
Gong (2013) found that both firm growth rate and 
smaller volumes of firm holdings bring higher ab-
normal returns, thus supporting the signaling hy-
pothesis. Given these empirical results, the current 
study hypothesized the following relationships:
H (1): The higher a firm’s sales growth rate, the 
higher the firm’s cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CARs);
H (2): The higher a firm’s profitability, the higher 
the firm’s CARs; and
H (3): The smaller the size of a firm, the higher the 
firm’s CARs.
The leverage ratio hypothesis posits that repurchas-
ing shares through debt financing could increase 
the debt ratio and optimize the capital structure 
of the firm (Dittmar, 2000). Dittmar argued that 
if a firm has a low level of debt in its capital struc-
ture, then share repurchase with debt financing 
could increase debt and reduce equity. This would 
push the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio toward the 
firm’s presumed optimal ratio. Similarly, Chan et 
al. (2004) argued that managers try to increase the 
leverage ratios by buying back shares. In addition, 
leveraged share repurchases could send investors 
the message that the acquisition of more debt in-
dicates greater managerial confidence in the firm’s 
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future (Gong, 2013). Park and Jung (2005) used 
a sample of Korean firms for the period 1994 to 
2000 to test this leverage ratio hypothesis. The 
study’s results demonstrated that share repurchas-
es by ﬁrms with high leverage ratios experienced 
higher abnormal returns. Lo et al. (2008) found 
that firms that repurchase shares though bor-
rowing tend to increase agency problems. Hence, 
firms that use debt to implement share repurchase 
would be expected to have higher cumulative ab-
normal returns. The following relationship is thus 
hypothesized:
H (4):  The higher the leverage ratio, the higher the 
CARs to the firm.
The ‘undervaluation’ hypothesis implies that 
firms repurchase shares to express their disagree-
ment on how the market prices existing public in-
formation (Jagannathan & Stephens, 2003). The 
undervaluation view suggests that in a market 
where information asymmetry exists, managers 
are better informed than shareholders, and man-
agers can use share repurchase to signal better fu-
ture prospects or undervaluation to shareholders 
(Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 
2004). Both Ginglinger & L’her (2006) and 
Grullon & Ikenberry (2000) found a positive 
association between CAR and the undervalu-
ation of the firm’s share prices based on the in-
formation signaling hypothesis. Consistent with 
Grullon and Michaely (2004), we use price-earn-
ings (PE) ratio to measure the degree of over-
valuation of a firm’s share. The higher the PE, the 
higher the overvaluation of the firm’s shares, and 
thus the lower CAR. The following relationship is 
hypothesized:
H (5):  The higher a firm’s price-earnings ratio (over-
valuation), the lower the firm’s CARs.
The social hypothesis states that maximizing 
social welfare is the government’s main role 
and SOEs should help the government by al-
locating resources to socially beneficial proj-
ects and firms in certain industries which have 
limited access to funds (Dey and Nair, 2013; 
Gerschenkron, 1962). If the social hypothesis 
holds, then higher government ownership of 
firms will be positivity associated with higher 
long-run economic growth rates. Based on the 
social hypothesis, Chen et al. (2006) argued that 
SOEs tend to have social and political objectives 
such as increasing the employment rate, owing 
to their political connections. SOEs are thereby 
more likely to be seen to have a wealth redis-
tribution orientation rather than one of wealth 
creation. 
Using a large data set drawn from Chinese public 
firms for the period 1994 to 2004, Tian and Estrin 
(2008) examined how government ownership in-
fluenced firms’ market performance. The authors 
find the effect of government ownership on corpo-
rate value to be curvilinear, up to a certain thresh-
old; as government shareholding increases firms’ 
value decreases; beyond this threshold, the value 
of firms increases. Tian and Estrin suggest that 
the value of a firm actually increases when gov-
ernment shareholding is relatively large. The au-
thors also advance the notion that ownership con-
centration and government partiality may explain 
their findings.
Another strand of literature is built on the gov-
ernment ownership view (Tirole, 1994), which 
states that the lack of oversight makes it pos-
sible for SOE managers to choose appropriate 
resources for their personal use. In addition, 
politicians are able to use SOEs as a tool for 
gaining political leverage. Based on the govern-
ment ownership view, Sun and Tong (2003) used 
market-to-book ratio, net income to sales and 
operating income to measure the performance 
of Chinese public firms. They found a signifi-
cant negative relationship (at the 10% level) be-
tween government ownership and firm value. 
Based on this reasoning, when firms buy back 
shares from government shareholders, both the 
degree of government ownership and inf luence 
they have over the firm’s operations are likely 
to decrease. In addition, the repurchasing firm’s 
operating efficiency may increase as a conse-
quence of reduced government ownership. As 
a result, investors view share repurchasing as a 
positive signal and a firm’s abnormal share re-
turns are thus more likely to increase. Based on 
the above arguments, the following relationship 
is hypothesized:
H (6): Repurchasing from SOE shareholders will 
yield higher CARs to the firm.
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2. METHODS
2.1. Data collection
The history of share repurchase in China can be 
separated into three stages: an early stage from 
1992 to 2005, a transitional stage from 2005 to 2008 
and a continuing developmental stage after 2008 
(Gong, 2013). Our initial sample time frame spans 
from 1992 to 2012 in order to capture all three 
share repurchase stages. However, prior to 2000, 
only one firm announced a share repurchase pro-
gram. We therefore dropped the years prior to 2000. 
Our sample thus includes 417 share repurchase an-
nouncements for the period of 2000 to 2012.
The name of the repurchasing firm, the day of repur-
chase, the number of shares repurchased and other 
details relevant to the repurchase of shares were ob-
tained from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. Firm characteristics 
used in the multi-factor regression models were also 
retrieved from the CSMAR database. 
The Chinese stock market is unique because of its 
triple-trading scheme. Domestic investors can only 
trade A (local) shares. Foreign investors are restrict-
ed to trading B (foreign) shares, which are denomi-
nated in US dollars, whilst investors in Hong Kong 
(and elsewhere) trade H shares denominated in 
Hong Kong dollars (Wang & Jiang, 2004). Fernald 
and Rogers (1998) suggested that although the two 
share types (A and B) have the same characteristics 
such as voting and profit-sharing rights, foreign in-
vestors pay a smaller price for B shares than for the 
equivalent A shares. One important characteristic 
of the B shares is that they are traded at an average 
discount of about 60% to the prices at which domes-
tic A shares are traded (Chakravarty et al., 1998). 
This is because foreign investors have less informa-
tion about Chinese shares than domestic investors. 
Therefore, we deleted 12 B share repurchase an-
nouncements in our analysis. We also deleted 15 H 
share announcements because these shares are on-
ly available to Hong Kong and international inves-
tors. Moreover, Wang and Jiang (2004) found that 
H shares are more exposed to Hong Kong market 
risks and display behaviors similar to other shares 
traded in the Hong Kong market. This resulted in a 
final sample size of 364 repurchase announcements 
for the period of 2000 to 2012. 
Following Grullon and Michaely’s (2004) meth-
od, we use the first announcement in the month 
as the data event, when a firm issues multiple re-
purchase announcements during the same month. 
This is a data proximity problem, because if two 
repurchase announcements are very close to each 
other (say, within the same month), then it will 
be very difficult to distinguish the cumulative ab-
normal returns of the two (or more) such adjacent 
announcements. 
2.2. Calculation of cumulative  
abnormal returns 
Fama et al. (1969) studied stock splits using the mar-
ket model to examine abnormal returns. The inter-
cept and slope from the regression of a stock’s return 
on the market return, estimated outside the event 
period, were used to estimate the stock’s expected 
returns conditional on market returns during the 
event. The market model regresses a share’s returns 
and returns on the market via ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and uses this relationship to produce the fitted 
or expected returns during the estimation window. 
In the present case, the model can be written as:
, 0 1 , , ,i t m t i tR R eβ β= + +  (1)
where ,i tR  – return for security i on day t; 
 ,m t
R  – return for the market index on day t; 
 i
β  – the market model slope for security i; 
 ,i t
e  – random error term for security i on 
day t.
According to equation (1), once the fitted value

,( )i tR  is obtained from the market model, the ab-
normal return (AR) for firm i on day t through the 
event window can be calculated as:

, , , .i t i t i tAR R R= −  (2)
Banz (1981) argued that the market model failed to 
include anomalies in the cross-section of average 
returns. Fama (1998) suggested that event study 
methods should address the issue of anomalies 
in the cross-section of average returns. Further, 
Fama pointed out that the cross-section of expect-
ed returns could produce imperfect descriptions 
of average returns, which might then lead to bi-
ased estimations. 
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Other studies have used an asset pricing model 
to estimate abnormal returns (Fama, 1998; Gong, 
2013). Some earlier studies use the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the long-term 
abnormal returns (Jaffe, 1974; Asquith et al., 1983). 
For example, Asquith et al. (1983) calculate the ex-
cess return for an asset i as the difference between 
the actual return to the asset i and the return to its 
control portfolio. Asquith et al. grouped all securi-
ties listed on the New York Stock Exchange into ten 
equal control portfolios ranked according to their 
betas. The observed returns to the control portfo-
lio have approximately the same beta as the asset i. 
However, Fama and French (1992) suggested that 
the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) did 
not describe expected returns on small-capitaliza-
tion shares, arguing this was due to the bias of the 
sample towards large firms. They further argue, as 
did Fama (1998), that the risk adjustment with the 
CAPM can produce inaccurate abnormal returns 
when an event sample comprises mainly small-cap-
italization shares. 
Fama and French (1992) argued that average stock 
returns are also related to book-to-market equity 
(BE/ME) and firm size. The authors also empha-
sized that it is inappropriate to use the three-factor 
model to estimate the reaction of stock prices to 
firm-specific events such as share repurchases or 
splits. Later, Fama (1998) maintained that the mar-
ket model was appropriate for estimating the reac-
tion of stock prices to firm-specific events, but the 
market model failed to produce perfect descrip-
tions of average returns, which could lead to biased 
estimation. Therefore, we add the firm’s book-to-
market equity (BM) and firm size (Size) to the mar-
ket model in equation (1). 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , .i t m t i t i t i tR R BM Size eβ β β β= + + + +  (3)
The next step is to obtain the fitted value (, )i tR  
from equation (3), and use equation (2) to calcu-
late AR for firm i on day t through the event win-
dow. Next, we calculate the CARs during the event 
window (-20, 20) as follows:
( ) 20 ,
20
20, 20 .
i t
t
CAR AR
=−
− = ∑  (4)
Prior studies generally used event windows of a 
month or wider, in order to capture more share 
return behavior before and after the share repur-
chase agreement event. For example, Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) collected monthly data across 
73 months to estimate their model. Hatakeda and 
Isagawa (2004) gathered daily stock return data 
on each of their sample firms for periods that be-
gan 20 days before and 20 days after repurchase. 
Consistent with Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004), our 
event window ranges from 20 days prior to the re-
purchase announcements to 20 days after repur-
chase, a total of 40 days. 
2.3. Multi-factor model
Gong (2013) includes other variables in the re-
gression model to test factors that may affect ab-
normal returns during the event window. These 
variables include sales growth rate (SGR), return 
on equity (ROE), liabilities-to-assets rate (LAR), 
company size (SIZE), price-to-earnings rate (PE), 
and the largest shareholder’s share-holding rate 
(LSSR). Gong’s results show positive associations 
between SGR, ROE and CAR, which imply that 
Chinese investors put more emphasis on the firm’s 
future growth and profitability. Further, the anal-
ysis shows a negative association between firm 
size and CAR, which suggests that the smaller the 
company, the bigger the repurchase announce-
ment effect. There was also a positive relationship 
between LSSR and CAR reported, which suggests 
the more confidence large blockholders have in 
the firm’s future, the higher the abnormal return 
earned. Gong failed to find any relationship be-
tween the liabilities-to-assets rate and price-to-
earnings rate.
We use equation (5) to test hypotheses (1) to (6)
( ) 0 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 ,
20, 20
_   .
i i
i i i
i i i t
CAR SG ROE
lnLEVERAGE SIZE PE
GOV SELL ESOP E
β β β
β β β
β β
− = + + +
+ +
+ +
+ +
+
 (5)
Equation (5) uses sales growth rate (SG) and re-
turn on equity (ROE) to capture the firm’s fu-
ture earning ability. Ho et al. (1997) found that 
a firm’s abnormal stock return following a share 
repurchase announcement is positively related to 
preceding sales growth. Gong (2013) studied the 
share repurchases of a sample of Chinese public 
firms, finding that greater profits, measured by 
ROE, lead to higher abnormal returns. 
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In equation (5), lnLEVERAGE is the natural log-
arithm of book leverage. Dittmar (2000) argued 
that if a firm has a low level of debt in its capital 
structure, then share repurchase with debt financ-
ing could increase debt, reduce equity and thus 
increase the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio toward the 
optimal ratio. Chan et al. (2004) argue that man-
agers do attempt to increase the leverage ratios by 
buying back shares. In addition, share repurchases 
with leverage send investors the message that the 
more debt a firm incurs, the more confident are 
the mangers about the firm’s future (Gong, 2013).
SIZE in equation (5) represents firm size and is 
measured by the firm’s logarithm of gross sales. 
Vermaelen (1981) suggests that small firms’ re-
purchases contain more information than large 
firms, thus the abnormal returns should be large 
for small firms compared to large firms. Zhang 
(2005) uses actual share repurchase data from 
the Hong Kong market to investigate share price 
returns, finding that the market appears to favor 
most share repurchases made by small firms.
We use price-to-earnings ratio (PE) to measure 
overvaluation. PE measures the discrepancy be-
tween the firm’s market price (P) and intrinsic value 
(E) (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). If the PE equals 5, 
it implies that it takes five years for the firm’s inves-
tor to return the initial investment (market price), 
assuming the current firm’s earnings are constant. 
Hence, the higher the PE, the higher the overvalu-
ation of the firm’s shares (Grullon & Michaely, 
2004). If the company decides to buy back shares in 
order to deliver the message of stock price under-
valuation, then the CARs (-20, 20) should be nega-
tive with the independent variable, PE.
Bens et al. (2002) show that share repurchase an-
nouncements often coincide with the exercise of 
an executive stock option (ESOP). Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000) argued that the impact of ESOPs 
on the firm’s capital structure can be substantial. 
Fenn and Liang (2001) also found a strong nega-
tive relationship between dividends and manage-
ment stock options and a positive relationship be-
tween share repurchases and management stock 
options. Hence, when an ESOP is close to expira-
tion, the firm is obligated to buy shares from the 
manager to exercise his/her options. The market 
is likely to view the share repurchase as a negative 
signal, since the interest-aligning effect of ESOP 
has come to an end. We use ESOP as a dummy 
variable in equation (5), which takes a value of 1 
when the motivation of share repurchase is to 
meet the demand from the ESOP holders to exer-
cise their options; 0 otherwise. 
We also include GOV_SELL as a dummy variable in 
order to test the effect of reduced government hold-
ings on the market response (in this case, firms buy 
back shares from the government agencies or SOE 
shareholders). When firms buy back shares from 
government shareholders, both government own-
ership and influence over the firm’s operations de-
crease. The repurchasing firm’s operating efficiency 
may thus increase owing to reduced government 
ownership. As a result, investors view share re-
purchases as a positive signal and firms’ abnormal 
share returns are more likely to increase
LEVERAGE, ROE, SIZE and PE are obtained from 
the firm’s most recent quarterly report following 
the repurchase announcement. We take the natu-
ral logarithm of leverage and gross sales to ensure 
the two variables are normally distributed. Table 
1 provides the definitions of the variables used in 
equation (5).
Table 1. Variable definitions (for equation (5))
Variable name Variable definition
Dependent variable
CAR Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the event window (-20, 20)
Independent variable
SG Firm’s sales growth rate (average grow rate of sales the past two years)
ROE Return on equity
LEVERAGE Firms’ leverage ratio (book debt/market value of equity)
SIZE Ln (firms’ gross sales in millions)
PE Price-earnings ratio
ESOP
ESOP equals 1 when the motivation 
of share repurchase is for the ESOP 
holders to exercise their options; 
0 otherwise
GOV_SELL
Government seller equals 1 when 
firms buy back shares from the 
government agencies or SOE 
shareholders; 0 otherwise
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3. RESULTS 
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the summary of the share repur-
chase activities in both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
share markets for the period 2000 to 2012. The 
table includes the number of firms engaged in re-
purchase, number of share repurchase announce-
ments and total shares repurchased in China 
across the study period. The table documents rela-
tively low frequencies of repurchase announce-
ments for the five years of the study period, with 
a greater reliance on the strategy in more recent 
years. Though there is a degree of variability 
across the years, there is also a general trend to-
ward increasing numbers of announcements.  The 
last year in the study, 2012 was atypical, provided 
a nearly three-fold increase over the previous year. 
The mean shares purchased, however, display an 
interesting and relatively consistent average vol-
ume after 2003 (excepting 2007, which provided a 
dramatic increase over the previous year).
Table 2. Summary for share repurchases  
in Chinese share markets (2000–2012)
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2000 6 6 312,062,753 52,010,459
2001 2 2 5,371,056 2,685,528
2002 3 5 4,874,700 974,940
2003 3 3 12,457,112 4,152,371
2004 1 1 45,960,000 45,960,000
2005 11 15 684,300,000 45,620,000
2006 30 33 1,879,869,418 56,965,740
2007 19 23 1,616,840,594 70,297,417
2008 32 36 1,860,081,200 51,668,922
2009 19 24 1,035,519,740 43,146,239
2010 39 42 1,913,524,551 45,560,108
2011 46 48 2,349,275,089 48,943,231
2012 96 126 5,130,733,035 40,720,103
Source: CSMAR database and author’s calculation. 
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Figure 1. Frequencies of share repurchase 
announcements (2000–2012)
Figure 1 shows the number of share repurchase an-
nouncements over the study period. Both Table 2 
and Figure 1 document that share repurchases were 
not particularly popular as a payout method until 
2006. This is likely because share market reform in 
China began on April 29, 2005, when the Chinese 
government implemented reforms aimed at elimi-
nating the non-tradable shares (NTS) typically held 
by the state or by politically connected institutional 
investors. Such NTS vehicles were issued at an early 
stage of China’s modern financial market develop-
ment process (Bortolotti et al., 2011). In 2005, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
implemented the Administration of Repurchase 
of Public Shares by Listed Companies Procedures, 
which relaxed the restrictions on public firms re-
purchasing their shares on the open market (CSRC, 
2005). Share repurchases have remained an active 
and increasingly relied upon strategy since then, as 
evidenced by the generally upward trajectory of re-
purchase announcements. 
Figure 2 shows that investors suffered generally 
negative or near-zero (including slightly positive) 
abnormal returns before repurchase announce-
ment day (day 0). Following on from day 0, the 
average CARs becomes increasingly positive. The 
positive CARs after day 0 shows that investors re-
act in a positive way to the firm’s share repurchase 
announcement, though the CARs reaches a peak 
of 16% on about day 16, declining thereafter (see 
Figure 2). This implies that the further the share 
price is depressed, the higher the abnormal re-
turns in the long run (Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009). 
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Source: CSMAR database and author’s calculation 
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Figure 2. Average cumulative abnormal returns (with event window (-20, 20))
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used in the equation (5). The negative median 
CARs implies that share markets do not favour the 
repurchase announcements as a method for bidding 
up share prices. The median CARs (-0.013) for our 
sample suggests that on average, the Chinese public 
firm cumulative abnormal returns decrease by 1.3% 
during the 20 days before and 20 days after the share 
repurchase agreement. The median sales growth 
rate of 0.108 suggests that, on average, Chinese pub-
lic firm exhibits a growth rate of nearly 11%. The me-
dian return on equity is 0.019, indicating that the re-
turn of shareholders’ equity for an average Chinese 
public firm is about 2 cents per share. The median 
leverage of 0.313 suggests that an average Chinese 
public firm has a debt equity ratio of about 31%. The 
median firm size measured by gross sales is 0.812 or 
812,000 RMB. The median price-to-earnings ratio is 
32.559 infers on average, an investor has to use about 
33 years to recover the share price. 
Table 4 shows the CARs remain positive with 
the event window during the repurchase an-
nouncement (-20, 20) period we focused upon. 
The CARs under the symmetrical conditions 
of (-1, 1), (-5, 5), (-10, 10), (-15, 15) and (-20, 20) 
are 2.64%, 5.28%, 6.63%, 9.02% and 5.43%, re-
spectively. These are all positive and significant 
at the 5% level, showing that the market per-
ceives repurchase announcements as convey-
ing positive and meaningful information about 
the firm’s future performance over these inter-
vals. This has the impact of driving share prices 
upwards.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics during the event window (-20, 20)
Variables Mean SD. Min. Median Max. Obs.
CARs -0.018 0.160 -0.730 -0.013 0.292 364
Book-to-market equity 0.658 0.401 0.012 0.667 3.251 364
Gross sales 0.975 11.401 0.301 0.812 79.427 364
Sales growth rate 0.157 0.241 -0.654 0.108 1.178 364
Return on equity 0.018 0.068 -0.341 0.019 0.226 364
Leverage 0.522 0.544 0.026 0.313 2.018 364
Price-to-earnings ratio 145.648 418.075 -16.728 32.559 2103.970  364
Source: CSMAR database and authors’ calculations.
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Table 4. Break-down of cumulative abnormal 
returns
Source: CSMAR database and authors’ calculations.
Window CARs (%) t-value
(-1, 1) 2.64 2.560**
(-5, 5) 5.28 3.540***
(-10, 10) 6.63 3.149***
(-15, 15) 9.02 3.634***
(-20, 20) 5.43 3.178***
(-5, -1) 2.88 3.075***
(-10, -1) 3. 08 3.282***
(-15, -1) 3.54 3.101***
(-20, -1) 3.85 3.287***
(0, 1) 2.07 0.758
(0, 5) 1.98 0.815
(0, 10) 1.64 0.645
(0, 15) 10.28 0.473
(0, 20) 1.24 0.501
Notes: ** , and *** significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4 also breaks down CARs (-20, 20) into pre-
announcement dates (-5, -1), (-10, -1), (-15, -1), and 
(-20, -1) and post-announcement dates (0, 1), (0, 5), 
(0, 10), (0, 15), and (0, 20). The CARs for each of the 
four pre-announcement are positive and signifi-
cant at the 1% level, implying that the shareholders 
could make abnormal returns even before release 
of the share repurchase announcement. Consistent 
with Gong (2013) and Quan and Wu (2010), our 
finding provides evidence of information leakage 
and insider dealing in Chinese share markets.
In contrast, though the post-announcement 
CARs are positive, they are insignificant for all 
five combinations. This provides evidence that 
a positive market reaction towards repurchase 
announcements would not persist. This finding 
is consistent with the argument presented by 
Evans and Evans (2001), who suggested that the 
implementation of a repurchasing strategy can-
not guarantee the firm’s superior long-run per-
formance. The non-persistence of CARs is like-
ly due to market uncertainties over the manag-
ers’ ability to time repurchase announcements, 
where managers only buy back shares following 
declines in the prices for the stocks covered by 
their options agreements (Brockman & Chung, 
2001; Cook et al., 2004).
3.2. Estimated results  
of the multi-factor model
This section investigates the factors that affect the 
firm’s CARs within the event window (-20, 20). We 
estimate equation (5) using the OLS procedure. To 
address the potential heteroskedasticity problem, 
we employ White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust 
t-values in our estimation. Column (1) in Table 5 
reports the results with the dummy GOV_SELL, 
column (2) with the dummy ESOP and column (3) 
with both GOV_SELL and ESOP in the model.
Consistent with Ho et al. (1997), the results present-
ed in Table 5 show that high levels of sales growth 
rates lead to higher CARs across columns (1) to (3). 
Specifically, the SG coefficient is 0.190 in both col-
umns (2) and (3), which implies that a 1% increase 
in the sales growth rate of the firm lead to a nearly 
0.2% increase in the firm’s cumulative abnormal 
returns, with the SG reported in column only very 
slightly less. Similarly, Gong (2013) finds a positive 
effect of the sales growth rate on CAR in his study.
Table 5. Estimated results of multi-factor model 
(equation (5))
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Dependent variable: CARs (-20, 20)
Variable Expected sign (1) (2) (3)
SG +
0.184 0.190 0.190
(0.092)** (0.092)** (0.093)**
ROE +
-0.214 -0.216 -0.211
(0.324) (0.324) (0.325)
lnLEVERAGE +
-0.026 -0.023 -0.027
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
SIZE -
0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PE -
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
GOV_SELL +
0.024 0.043
(0.043) (0.048)
ESOP -
0.038 0.064
(0.063) (0.070)
R2_Adjusted 0.56 0.56 0.56
n 364 364 364
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. **, and *** signifi-
cant at the 5% and 1% level. Coefficients on intercepts are 
not reported. Blank in column (1) indicates that ESOP is not 
in the model.  Blank in column (2) means that GOV_SELL 
is not in the model. In column (3), we run our model with 
both variables.
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However, Gong’s coefficient estimate on the sales 
growth rate, 0.014, is somewhat smaller than our SG 
coefficients. This is probably because Gong used a 
shorter event window (-5, 5) than our study (-20, 20). 
Our longer event window allows us to generate more 
robust results. Hence, our findings add new support 
to notion that firms with higher sales growth rates 
are more likely to send a positive signal to the market 
though share repurchase in the Chinese share mar-
ket. These findings thus support H (1). 
Consistent with both Ginglinger and L’her’ (2006) 
and Grullon and Ikenberry’ (2000) results, we find 
strong evidence to support H (5), that firms with 
overvalued shares are more likely to send a nega-
tive signal to the market through share repurchases. 
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 5 present a PE coefficient 
of 0.003 for each, implying that a 1-unit increase in 
the price-to-earnings ratio of the firm may lead to a 
0.003-unit decrease in the firm’s cumulative abnor-
mal returns. 
One of the more important characteristics of the 
Chinese capital market is that government owner-
ship of firms is delegated to different agencies. The 
objectives of these agencies affect the degree of 
political intervention and the degree of commer-
cialization of the listed companies these govern-
ment agencies own (Tian & Estrin, 2008). Under 
the agency view of government ownership (Tirole, 
1994), the subsequent lack of incentive leads SOE 
mangers to misallocate resources for their per-
sonal use. In addition, politicians use SOEs as a 
tool to serve their political interests. Hence, when 
firms buy back shares from government share-
holders, both the degree of government ownership 
and its influence over the firm’s operations are ex-
pected to decrease. Thus the repurchasing firm’s 
operating efficiency and cumulative abnormal re-
turns may increase due to the reduced government 
ownership. However, the results in Table 5 reveal 
that the coefficient estimates of GOV_SELL are in-
significant. Thus, we did not find evidence to sup-
port H (6), that repurchases from SOE sharehold-
ers bring higher cumulative abnormal returns. 
One likely explanation for this contrary finding 
is that the size of share repurchases aimed at re-
ducing SOE ownership (55 repurchase announce-
ments) may not be large enough to substantially 
reduce the government’s ownership interest in the 
firm. In essence, while the government may sell 
off shares, it retains a large enough volume to con-
trol the business, thus sending a ‘business as usual’ 
signal to the market.
Defusco et al. (1990) and Brickley et al. (1999) found 
markets responded positively when there is an an-
nouncement of ESOPs. Such announcements are 
intended to counter the potential dilution caused 
by ESOPs. To date, there is no empirical evidence 
on how markets respond to an announcement of 
share repurchase. We expect that firms have the 
motive to repurchase their shares to counter the po-
tential dilution caused by the execution of the em-
ployee and executive share options incentive plans 
(Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). When an ESOP reach-
es maturity, the firm is obligated to buy shares for the 
firm’s managers to exercise their options. Thus, the 
market is likely to view the share repurchase as a neg-
ative signal, since the interest-aligning effect of ESOP 
comes to an end. The results presented in Table 5 
show the coefficient estimate on the dummy ESOP is 
insignificant. This implies that ESOP-motivated 
share repurchases have no effect on the firm’s cumu-
lative abnormal returns.
The results in Table 5 further show the ROE, SIZE 
and LnLEVERAGE coefficients as statistically in-
significant. We use ROE to capture the firm’s future 
earning ability, as it indicates the past earning abil-
ity of the firm. This should be positively related with 
the market’s response to the share repurchase an-
nouncement (Ikenberry et al., 1986). In Table 5, the 
ROE coefficient is insignificant, which suggests that 
higher profitability fails to send a positive signal to 
the market through share repurchases. This result is 
consistent with the finding of Gong (2013), who al-
so found ROE to have an insignificant impact in his 
study of 185 Chinese mainland share repurchases 
during the period between 2003 and 2013. 
The information signaling hypothesis suggests 
that small firms making fixed-price repurchase of-
fers are likely to be sending a private information-
signal to the market (Louis & White, 2007) and 
their repurchases should contain more informa-
tion than large firm (Vermaelen, 1981). However, 
in our study the SIZE coefficient is insignificant, 
which suggests that there is no association be-
tween the firm’s cumulative abnormal returns and 
firm size, as measured by gross sales. Thus, our re-
sults do not support H (2) or H (3).
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The leverage ratio hypothesis proposes that repur-
chasing shares through debt financing would in-
crease the debt ratio and helps the firm optimize its 
capital structure (Dittmar, 2000). Specifically, if a 
firm has a low level of debt, then share repurchases 
via financing would increas debt, reduce equity and 
thus increases the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio toward 
the presumed optimal ratio. It is possible that such 
debt-leveraged repurchases might signal that acquir-
ing more debt indicates management’s confidence in 
the future success of the firm (Gong, 2013). However, 
our results show no evidence to support H (4).
3.3. Robustness tests
To address the heteroskedasticity problem in our 
multi-factor regression results (see Table 5), we 
1 The robustness test results are available upon request.
employ White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust 
t-values in our estimation. Beaver (1968) point-
ed out that event-induced heteroskedasticity can 
generate biased estimates. The event-induced het-
eroskedasticity refers to a situation where the ab-
normal return estimator will likely exhibit greater 
variance during the event period than in the pe-
riods both before and after the announcement. 
Binder (1998) argued that this is because the event 
day share return is affected by the announcement’s 
random shock as well as by other shocks peculiar 
to the firm. To address this event-induced hetero-
skedasticity issue, we employ the system dynamic 
system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. Further, we use total assets as an alter-
native specification for firm size. The robustness 
test results remained unchanged1. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The present study investigates the motivations behind share repurchases and the firms’ operating per-
formance surrounding share repurchase announcements in the Chinese share markets. The empirical 
results show the market responds most favorably to repurchases that are made by high-growth and 
undervalued firms. Similar to Ginglinger and L’her (2006) and Grullon and Ikenberry (2000), we find 
strong evidence that firms with overvalued shares with high price-to earnings ratios are more likely to 
send a negative signal to the market through share repurchase efforts.
Government intervention is a unique characteristic of the Chinese capital market, where the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have a dominant role in the share market (Huang et al., 2011). However, our results 
failed to support the hypothesis that the repurchasing firm’s CARs may increase due to the reduction in 
government ownership when firms buy back shares from government shareholders. One likely explana-
tion is that the size of share repurchase aimed at reducing SOE ownership (represented by 55 repurchase 
announcements in our study) may not be large enough to substantially reduce government ownership in 
the firm. Moreover, we expect that ESOP-related repurchases will send conflicting signals to the market. 
However, we have found an insignificant effect of the ESOP-related repurchases on the firm’s CARs.
We find no evidence to support the leverage hypothesis. Our results show that the market did not re-
spond to the firms changing its leverage ratio. Hence, altering capital structure was not a motivation 
behind open market repurchases. In addition, we found no evidence that small firms are more likely to 
signal to the market nor that their repurchases should contain more information than large firm. Thus 
the information signaling hypothesis based on firm size was not supported.
The results of this study have implications for policy development and redesign. First, CSRC should 
modify share buy-back requirements, perhaps reducing their complexity or the number of regulations 
that apply to the practice. In addition, it might be prudent to simplify the procedures necessary for firms 
to buy back their shares. For example, regulations might prohibit the filing for a share repurchase if the 
firm had issued an IPO within the previous year. Second, CSRC might adopt a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy 
on insiders’ transactions and information leakage, to eliminate the chance of internal share owners 
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taking advantage of the information they have about the company’s health and performance. This is 
particularly important because unscrupulous insiders could make ‘individualized abnormal returns’ 
before the share repurchase announcement is made public; such activities are clearly unfair and disad-
vantage other investors who do not have access to inside information. Finally, the repurchasing firm’s 
public image is likely to suffer from revelations of information leakage. Policies should thus be designed 
that enhance the potential for identifying and censuring the sources of such leaks and to minimize the 
potential for leakages to occur.
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